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Minneapolis Municipal Construction
Contracts: Awarding Methodologies and
Affirmative Action
Jon Schoenwetter†
Introduction
In 2016, the State of Minnesota issued nearly seven billion
dollars of construction permits at the state and local level.1 As most
cities do not maintain a staff of construction laborers, architects,
and engineers, cities must look to private construction companies to
realize these projects. In doing so, government officials must choose
which private contractor receives a given construction project
through the contract awarding process.
During this process, government officials owe a duty to expend
public funds wisely.2 Traditionally, this entailed advertising a
project proposal, soliciting bids from private contractors, comparing
the bids, and then awarding the contract to the lowest bidder.3 In
general, the final award will be beyond reproach where the process
allows for open, competitive bidding of a contract.4

† Jon Schoenwetter is a third-year law student at the University of Minnesota.
Prior to law school, Jon worked as a real estate salesperson in the Minneapolis,
Minnesota area. Jon has used these experiences to study the impact construction,
zoning, and housing policies have on affordability, employment, and equity.
Following graduation, Jon will be practicing construction law in downtown
Minneapolis.
1. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL VALUE OF STATE AND LOCAL
CONSTRUCTION PUT IN PLACE BY STATE: 2006–2016 (2016), https://www.census.gov/c
onstruction/c30/pdf/slstate.pdf.
2. While the exact process government units use to award contracts varies, all
processes attempt to balance protecting the public from potential graft and
favoritism while empowering officials to select proposals which, from a holistic
perspective, provide the best value to the public. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.28 (2007)
(offering municipalities the option to use a less mechanical bidding process known
as “best value alternative” along with the more traditional “lowest responsible
bidder” process).
3. See Elliot v. City of Minneapolis, 60 N.W. 1081, 1083 (Minn. 1894) (holding
that municipal corporations hold funds in “public trust”); 10 EUGENE MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 29:33 (3d ed. 2017) (stating that even in the absence of
statutory requirements concerning the bidding process, public officials must act in
good faith and for the best interest of the municipality in awarding contracts).
4. Coller v. City of Saint Paul, 26 N.W.2d 835, 841–42 (Minn. 1947) (“In the
area of discretion is precisely where such abuses as fraud, favoritism, extravagance,
and improvidence in connection with the letting of contracts are prevalent. . . . [T]he
purposes of requirements for competitive bidding are to prevent such abuses by
eliminating opportunities for committing them and to promote honesty, economy,
and aboveboard dealing.”).
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The awarding process becomes more complex where state and
local governments incorporate affirmative action policies into the
awarding process in an effort to redress the effects of discrimination
upon classes of persons.5 While the concept of affirmative action
may be “common and well understood,”6 its implementation has
proven to be an enduring and contentious element of our national
discourse7 in both the courts8 and the headlines.9 While higher
education may be the most frequent backdrop for discussing
affirmative action, the effect of these policies on the public contract
awarding process deserves similar applause and attention.
Within the construction industry, these initiatives have
become known as “set-aside programs” because they commonly aim
to set aside a certain portion of government projects to historically
disadvantaged groups.10 Typically, these set-aside programs
augment the traditional, “lowest bidder” methodology by requiring
bidders to demonstrate that they have a plan to meet participation
5. See generally, UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, CLEARINGHOUSE PUB. 54, at 102 (Oct. 1977) (“[A]ffirmative
action . . . encompasses any measure, beyond simple termination of a discriminatory
practice, adopted to correct or compensate for past or present discrimination or
prevent discrimination from recurring in the future.”); Adam Winkler, Sounds of
Silence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 923, 926
(1995) (“Affirmative action is essentially the use of race consciousness in a
preferential manner intended not to stigmatize, but to provide a modicum of equality
to members of those groups that historically have been the victims of discrimination
and subordination.”).
6. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
7. The issue of affirmative action reached the highest office in 2003, when thenPresident George W. Bush commented on its role in higher education: “At the law
school, some minority students are admitted to percentage targets while other
applicants with higher grades and better scores are passed over. This means that
students are being selected or rejected based primarily on the color of their skin. The
motivation for such an admissions policy may be very good. But it’s [sic] result is
discrimination and that discrimination is wrong.” George W. Bush, President,
United States, Address Concerning Affirmative Action in Grutter v. Bollinger (Jan.
15, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/15/politics/bushs-statement-on-affirmati
ve-action.html.
8. See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2202 (2016)
(upholding University of Texas admissions criteria that considered race as a factor
within the applicant’s “Personal Achievement Index”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (holding that the use of race as a “plus” factor, but not as a predominant
factor, in admissions decisions in order to obtain the benefits of a diverse student
body is permissible).
9. Melissa Korn & Nicole Hong, Harvard Faces Probe over Admissions Policy,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2017, at A1.
10. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), abrogated by Adarand
Constructors, 515 U.S. at 245 (recognizing a provision of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977 that required recipients of federal funds to disburse 10% of
the funds to minority business enterprises as a “set-aside program”).

2019]

Minneapolis Municipal Construction Contracts

213

targets for minority- or women-owned business participation.11
Typically, a bidder unable to meet targets will not be considered for
bidding purposes, regardless of the financial competitiveness of the
bid.
This Note presupposes that the way the bidding system
operates both affects, and is affected by, set-aside program
requirements. This Note argues that the Minneapolis set-aside
program, known as the Small and Underutilized Business Program
(“SUBP”), has developed in a disjointed manner from the broader
Minnesota municipal contracting law, and suggests that
harmonizing these two systems will allow SUBP to more effectively
achieve its policy goals. Section I will outline the statutory
requirements of SUBP, Minnesota contract awarding law, and
formative constitutional challenges to set-aside programs in state
and federal courts. In Section II, this Note proposes a potential
SUBP reform, namely incorporating participation goals as
qualitative factors during the bidding process. The Author believes
this reform will further the effectiveness of SUBP while according
with Fourteenth Amendment limitations on set-aside programs
established by the Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Construction.12
I.

Background
A. Purpose and Process of the Minneapolis Small and
Underutilized Business Program

Recognizing the existence of unequal access to the competitive
bidding process, municipalities across the country have
incorporated substantive bidding requirements relating to Women
and Minority-owned Business Enterprises (“WMBEs”).13 Minnesota
is no exception. The State legislature has explicitly provided
municipalities the opportunity to set aside government contracting
work for “targeted small group business.”14 The most immediate

11. See Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Florida Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cty., 122 F.3d
895, 900–02 (11th Cir. 1997) (summarizing this type of set-aside program).
12. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989).
13. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MINORITY AND WOMEN AS GOV’T
CONTRACTORS i (1975) (“[M]inority and female-owned firms encounter problems of
staggering proportions in obtaining information on Federal, State, and local
government contracting opportunities in time to submit timely bids, and in obtaining
the working capital necessary for effective marketing and bidding.”).
14. MINN. STAT. § 471.345(8) (2018) (providing that set-aside programs must not
cause anticipated contracting expenses to exceed a five percent premium over open
market rates).
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beneficiaries of SUBP are construction subcontractors that qualify
for the set-aside amounts. Principally, these are small construction
businesses—skilled in a certain trade—and owned by ethnic
minorities and women. When applying to become a WMBE, the
primary threshold for these businesses is to show that they are
“majority owned and operated by women, persons with a
substantial physical disability, or specific minorities.”15
Since 1976, the City of Minneapolis has maintained a set-aside
program for city construction and other contracts.16 In 1999, the
Minneapolis City Council enacted the current set-aside program,
SUBP, to combat discriminatory outcomes persisting under the
prior set-aside system.17 Chapter 423 of the Minneapolis Code of
Ordinances (“Code”) establishes the requirements, process, and
procedures of the current set-aside program.18 In 2017, SUBP aimed
to provide twelve and thirteen percent of every government contract
dollar to women- and minority-owned businesses, respectively.19
Bidders must comply with SUBP targets for any municipal
contract valued in excess of $175,000.20 Given the cost of
construction projects, this value threshold means that SUBP will
likely apply in every construction project larger in scope than simple
maintenance, repairs, or light renovations. If a project exceeds the
value threshold, the Contract Compliance Department of the
15. Matter of Ultraflex Enterprises’ Appeal from Decertification in Minnesota
Small Bus. Procurement Program, 497 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
MINN. STAT. § 16B.19 (2)(b) (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 423.30 (2011) (defining
“minority” as “a citizen of the United States or lawfully admitted permanent resident
who is African American, Hispanic, Native American or Asian/Pacific Islander . . .
[or] who is determined, through a certification process, to be a socially and
economically disadvantaged individual.”); CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, DEP’T OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, MINNESOTA UNIFIED CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (2017), http://www.ci.minne
apolis.mn.us/civilrights/contractcompliance/subp/WCMS1P-124728.
16. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMENOWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM MINNEAPOLIS 255 (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@civilrights/documents/webcont
ent/wcms1p-084807.pdf.
17. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 423 (2011).
18. Id.
19. KEEN INDEPENDENT RESEARCH, 2017 MINNESOTA JOINT DISPARITY STUDY:
CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS 2 (Mar. 2018), https://mn.gov/admin/assets/KeenIndependent
MinneapolisDisparityStudyFullReport03122018_tcm36-331971.pdf.
20. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 423.30 (2011)
(requiring small businesses to meet the criteria set forth by the United States Small
Business Association and have their principal place of business within Anoka,
Carver, Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin, Isanti, Ramsey, Scott, Sherburne, Washington,
or Wright County); NERA, supra note 16, at 258 (requiring that businesses be
certified as WMBEs by the Minnesota Unified Certification Program to take
advantage of the benefits of SUBP participation).
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Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights (“CCD”) will review the
project and assess whether it presents work opportunities for
WMBEs.21 Here, the CCD will consider (a) whether there are
WMBEs capable of doing the work and (b) whether there are
subcontracting positions on the project.22 If the CCD answers both
in the affirmative, then the CCD is required to establish WMBE
participation goals for the project.23 While the CCD has the
discretion to set WMBE goals at whatever level it deems
appropriate for an individual project, the City of Minneapolis
maintains aggregate goals for various types of work on construction
contracts in addition to the city-wide targets mentioned previously.
For example, the city maintains a goal for women- and minorityowned businesses to contribute six percent and thirty-two percent
of on-site construction labor, respectively.24
SUBP does not, however, require private contractors to hire
WMBEs. Instead, SUBP requires that contractors only make “good
faith efforts” to hire WMBEs for the project.25 Accordingly, a
contractor unable to meet WMBE targets may nonetheless receive
a contract award, provided that they have received a good faith
efforts waiver from the CCD. In order to receive a waiver, the CCD
must find that the contractor made “every necessary and reasonable
effort to subcontract work to MBEs/WBEs.”26 In 2016, the CCD
21. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 423.40.
22. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, DEP’T OF CIVIL RIGHTS, MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
SMALL AND UNDERUTILIZED BUSINESS PROGRAM 1 (July 2017), http://www.ci.minne
apolis.mn.us/civilrights/contractcompliance/subp/WCMS1P-124726.
23. Id. at 2.
24. See CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, PURCHASING DEP’T, BIDS FOR 501 4TH AVENUE
SOUTH PARKING RAMP DEMOLITION PROJECT (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.ci.minneap
olis.mn.us/www/groups/public/@finance/documents/webcontent/wcmsp-205377.pdf.
25. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 423.90.
26. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 423.90(a) (providing
explicitly that the CCD, when determining whether the contractor made “every
necessary and reasonable effort” to hire WMBEs, may consider:
(1) Soliciting through all reasonable and available means (attendance at pre -bid
meetings, advertising and/or written notices) the interest of all MBEs/WBEs
certified in the scopes of work of the contract. The bidder or proposer must solicit
MBEs/WBEs in sufficient time prior to bid opening or the proposal deadline to
allow MBEs/WBEs to respond to solicitations. The bidder or proposer must
determine with certainty if the MBEs/WBEs are interested by taking appropriate
steps to follow up on initial solicitations.
(2) Selecting portions of the work to be performed by MBEs/WBEs in order to
increase the likelihood that the project goals will be achieved. This includes, where
appropriate, breaking out contract work into smaller units to facilitate MBE/WBE
participation, even when a contractor might otherwise prefer to perform these
work items with its own forces.
(3) Providing interested MBEs/WBEs with adequate information about the plans,
specifications, and requirements of the contract in a timely manner to assist them
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granted approximately two out of every three waiver applications it
received.27 While the Author was unable to locate contract-bycontract data to determine how often an entire contract bidding pool
was excused from WMBE targets, it requires no stretch of the
imagination to understand that Minneapolis may have difficulty
meeting SUBP targets where waivers are so commonly available.
To support compliance with WMBE targets, Minneapolis has
provided fines by reference to mandatory City of Minneapolis
contract provisions.28 Accordingly, if the CCD has probable cause to
believe a contractor violated any of the mandatory contract
provisions, including provisions requiring SUBP compliance, the
City of Minneapolis is entitled to withhold up to fifteen percent of
the contract price or assess five hundred dollars per day as
liquidated damages until the CCD, the City Council, or a court of
competent jurisdiction, finds the contractor in compliance.29
Additionally, SUBP provides a program-specific fine of up to
$10,000 if the contractor substitutes, reduces, or eliminates a
WMBE’s involvement without prior approval from the city.30
Finally, SUBP provides the city with the option—but not

in responding to a solicitation.
(4) The bidder or proposer must negotiate in good faith with interested
MBEs/WBEs and provide written documentation of such negotiation with each
such business.
(5) A bidder or proposer should consider a number of factors in negotiating with
potential MBE/WME subcontractors, and should take into consideration an
eligible MBE or WBE’s price and capabilities and scheduling as well as established
contract goals. However, the fact that there may be some additional costs involved
in finding and using eligible MBE’s/WBE’s is not is not in itself a sufficient reason
for a bidder or proposer’s failure to meet the established MBE/WBE goals, as long
as such costs are reasonable. The ability or desire to perform the work of a contract
with its own organization does not relieve the bidder or proposer of the
responsibility to make good faith efforts. Bidders or proposers are not, however,
required to accept higher quotes from eligible MBEs/WMBs if the price difference
is excessive or unreasonable.
(6) The bidder or proposer must make reasonable efforts to assist solicited eligible
MBEs/WBEs in obtaining bonding, lines of credit or insurance as required by the
city or by the bidder or proposer; provided that the bidder or proposer need not
provide financial assistance toward this effort.
(7) Effectively using the services of minority/woman community organizations;
minority/woman contractors’ groups; local, state and federal business assistance
offices; and other organizations as allowed on a case-by-case basis to provide
assistance in the solicitation and placement of MBEs/WBEs.
27. 2017 MINNESOTA JOINT DISPARITY STUDY, supra note 19, at 2.
28. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139.50 (requiring,
among other things, that the contractor furnish books and records to the CCD upon
request and for the purpose of investigating compliance with SUBP).
29. Id. at (a)(7).
30. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 423.100.
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obligation—to penalize a non-conforming contractor with a
suspension, debarment, or “at risk” designation.31
The withholding and liquidated damages provisions present
the most immediate consequence of violating SUBP requirements.
However, a noncomplying contractor’s greatest consequence is
likely ineligibility to bid for future contracts if the CCD discovers
that the contractor has failed to meet participation goals or has
otherwise been “[ir]responsible”32 or “unresponsive.”33 While any of
these results could prevent the contractor from securing future
contracts, the decision to disqualify is in the discretion of the
government unit awarding the contract. Indeed, the awarding body
is not required to find a contractor ineligible unless, within the last
three years, the Minnesota Department of Administration or
Transportation rendered monetary sanctions against the contractor
following two final determinations of SUBP violations.34 As the
timeline for large city construction projects is often measured in
years, contractors seem unlikely to be deterred by the “twice in
three years” threshold triggering mandatory disqualification.
B. The Process of Awarding a City Construction Contract:
Lowest Responsible Bidder
The participation goals, good faith waiver process, and
violation consequences set by SUBP overviewed above function
within the broader contract awarding law. The process required for
offering public contracts began to develop at the close of the
nineteenth century when the Minnesota Supreme Court decided
Elliot v. City of Minneapolis.35 In Elliot, the City of Minneapolis
solicited bids from contractors to provide fuel oil to various city
departments.36 Three contractors responded to the proposal and
31. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 423.120.
32. MINN. STAT. § 16C.285 (establishing the minimum criteria for a bidder to be
considered “responsible”).
33. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 423.40 (“Any bid or
proposal, where there is or has been a material lack of compliance with the
requirements of this chapter, shall be deemed to be an unresponsive bid or
proposal by the department and such lack of compliance shall be a sufficient basis
for the rejection of that bid or proposal by the City.”); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE
OF ORDINANCES tit. 16, ch. 139.50 (providing that the CCD, when conducting preaward compliance review, may consider: “The record of the entity under review
regarding observance of the City of Minneapolis contract compliance rules and
regulations . . . documentary evidence of the implementation of each of the
affirmative action standards set forth in the specifications” and past evidence of
affirmative action plan compliance).
34. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.285(3)(5).
35. Elliot, 60 N.W. 1081.
36. Id. at 1082.
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provided bids that listed the price for each department
individually.37 While the city had the right to award separate
departments to each bidder, it ultimately selected one contractor for
nearly every department, which resulted in a higher overall cost to
the city.38 The court upheld the contract on the grounds that the city
charter had left the decision-making process, “in a great measure,
to the honesty, discretion, and good judgment of the city council”
where differences between the bids were not large enough to
suggest fraud or abuse.39
While ultimately upholding the City of Minneapolis fuel oil
contract, the court cautioned against the broad discretion inherent
in an awarding process constrained only by a requirement to
advertise any proposal valued at more than $100.40 Aware of the
potential for abuse under a system that left all but the manner of
advertising in the hands of the awarding officials, the court
concluded that, “[p]ossibly, public interest might be better
subserved [sic] by . . . requiring contracts to be let to the lowest
responsible bidder, but that is a matter for the legislature to deal
with.”41
Listening to Elliot, municipalities began to promulgate
competitive bidding practices in order to curb the potential abuse of
public funds.42 Indeed, the twentieth century case law contains
many examples of contract invalidations because of a failure in the
competitive bidding process. For example, the courts invalidated
contract awards for (a) awardees who were not the lowest
responsible bidder,43 (b) substantial variances between the bid and
the proposal specifications,44 and (c) significant post-award
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1083.
41. Id.
42. Griswold v. Ramsey Cty., 65 N.W.2d 647, 651–52 (1954) (“The public welfare
is ordinarily best served . . . by letting construction contracts to the lowest qualified
bidder whereby all competitive contractors are given an equal opportunity and the
taxpayers are assured of the best bargain for the least money . . . [otherwise it would]
open the door to fraud in a manner which, if permitted, would emasculate the whole
system of competitive bidding.”).
43. Electronics Unlimited v. Vill. of Burnsville, 182 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn.
1971) (holding that awarding a radio equipment contract to the highest bidder was
an abuse of discretion by the awarding body).
44. See Coller, 26 N.W.2d at 840 (providing that a variance may be grounds for
invalidating the award where the variance gave the “bidder a substantial advantage
or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders.”); City of Bemidji v. Ervin, 282 N.W. 683
(Minn. 1938) (affirming invalidation of contract award for the construction of a power
plant on the grounds that the final contract varied the payment terms in the
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modifications.45 In recognizing the preeminence of the competitive
bidding process at this time, the Minnesota Supreme Court aptly
stated that “the only function of the public authority with respect to
bids after they have been received shall be to determine who is the
lowest responsible bidder.”46 These twentieth century decisions
indicated that municipalities must strictly adhere to an aboveboard
competitive bidding process or have their awards overturned.
In addition to a stringent competitive bidding process, cities
also include substantive bidding requirements. Municipalities may
frame these requirements as either prerequisites for bidding
eligibility or as an element for officials to consider when comparing
bids.47 For example, one substantive prerequisite to every
competitively-bid contract is that the bidder’s proposal be
“responsive” to the government’s solicitation—namely, that the
bidder offer the product or service under the terms and
specifications detailed in the proposal.48 In addition to the technical
specifications of the project, many of today’s proposals require
bidders to meet labor standards or post bonds.49 As the Minnesota
Supreme Court indicated in Carl Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, it is within this general scheme that set-aside
programs must operate.50
In Bolander, Bolander and another contractor, McCrossan,
were two of several bidders on a construction project to improve a
road.51 In its proposal, the City of Minneapolis specified that each
bidder must demonstrate a plan to subcontract ten percent of the
contract value to minority-owned businesses and five percent to

solicitation).
45. Griswold, 65 N.W.2d at 648.
46. Additionally, the court found that public officials letting contracts had a duty
to “adopt definite plans and specifications . . . framed as to permit free and open
bidding by all interested parties.” Coller, 26 N.W.2d 835 at 840.
47. The exact manner in which these requirements are considered depends on
whether the contract is offered within the “lowest responsible bid” or “best value
alternative” framework. See infra subsection C for a discussion of “best value
alternative” proposals.
48. Sutton v. City of Saint Paul, 48 N.W.2d 436, 440 (Minn. 1951) (citing 10
MCQUILLIN, MUN. CORPS., § 29.78 (3d ed.) (“Unless the bid responds to the proposal
in all material respects it is not a bid at all, but a new proposition.”)).
49. MINN. STAT. § 471.345(7) (permitting municipalities to establish “minimum
labor standards”); MINN. STAT. § 574.26(2) (requiring the posting of performance
bonds for contracts valued over $175,000).
50. Carl Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 451 N.W.2d 204 (Minn.
1990) (noting the importance of subcontracting requirements to the City of
Minneapolis’ goal).
51. Id.
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women-owned businesses.52 The proposal expressly stated that
failure to comply with this requirement would render the bid
nonresponsive and thereby disqualify the bid.53 In its bid,
McCrossan listed one minority-owned business that it would use
best efforts to subcontract fifteen percent of the project to, but failed
to list any women-owned businesses. After receipt of bids, the city
awarded the contract to the lowest bidder, McCrossan.54
Bolander sued to enjoin the award for noncompliance with the
women-owned business requirement.55 The trial court upheld the
award because it found that McCrossan’s failure to specifically list
a women-owned business did not prejudice the other bidders, and
so did not amount to material unresponsiveness. In reaching this
result, the court gave credence to McCrossan’s testimony that he
intended to hire a women-owned business.56 A divided court of
appeals reversed, holding that McCrossan’s failure to list a specific
women-owned business was materially unresponsive because it
granted McCrossan an advantage: it could approach prospective
WMBEs with the contract already in its pocket.57 The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that while
McCrossan’s failure would have been immaterial, the explicitness
of the proposal on the matter elevated the failure to material
unresponsiveness.58 Indeed, following Elliot, the Bolander court
rigidly interpreted bidding requirements and invalidated an award
for slight deviation from the proposal requirements.59
C. The Process of Awarding a City Construction Contract:
Shift to Best Value Alternative
At the opening of the twenty first century, the disapproval of
discretion promulgated by the post-Elliot line of cases seemed to
have climaxed and, starting in 2001, the Minnesota legislature
began to permit the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) to

52. Id. at 205 (stating that the proposal required the bidder to list the minority
and women owned businesses that they would use “best efforts” to subcontract with).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 206.
55. Id.
56. Bolander, 451 N.W.2d at 206.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 207.
59. Id. at 208 (“The purpose of [the women and minority owned subcontracting
requirements] was to assure that businesses owned and controlled by women or
minorities receive maximum feasible opportunity to be included in City
procurements and capital activities.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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award contracts within a “best value alternative” framework.60
Under this new system, the DOT was permitted to consider the
qualitative merits of a bid, in addition to the price, when selecting
an awardee.61 Unlike quantitative metrics—i.e., contract price—
qualitative metrics concern more intangible aspects to a bid—i.e.,
the bidder’s work history and the aesthetic appeal of the bid.
Under this new selection methodology, the DOT was required
to find that the public interest would be best served by letting the
project under the best value alternative.62 If answered
affirmatively, it then had to issue a Request for Qualifications
(“RFQ”) identifying the additional criteria it would use to evaluate
the bidders on the project.63 After receiving the potential bidders’
response to the RFQ, the DOT would then select two to five
contractors to a “short list” and supply each with a Request for
Proposals (“RFP”) that included further detail regarding the
project.64 The contractors would then submit revised proposals for
scoring by a Technical Review Committee to establish a Technical
Score for each bid.65 Finally, the Technical Review Committee
would divide each bid’s price by the Technical Score, with the
awarding body required to accept the lowest “adjusted” bid.66 As the

60. MINN. STAT. § 161.3412(1) (2006); Act of July 1, 2001, ch. 8, art. 3, sec. 2(1),
2001 Minn. Laws.
61. This has been described as “a selection process in which proposals contain
both price and qualitative components, and award is based upon a combination of
price and qualitative considerations. Qualitative considerations may include
technical design, technical approach, quality of proposed personnel, and/or
management plan. The award selection is based upon consideration of a combination
of technical and price factors to determine (or derive) the offer deemed most
advantageous and of the greatest value to the procuring agency.” Rochester City
Lines, Co. v. City of Rochester, 868 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. 2015).
62. See MINN. STAT. § 161.3412(3)(b) (2014).
63. MINN. STAT. § 16C.28(1)(b) (2014) (providing a non-exhaustive list of factors
including: “(1) the quality of the vendor’s or contractor’s performance on previous
projects; (2) the timeliness of the vendor’s or contractor’s performance on previous
projects; (3) the level of customer satisfaction with the vendor’s or contractor’s
performance on previous projects; (4) the vendor’s or contractor’s record of
performing previous projects on budget and ability to minimize cost overruns; (5) the
vendor’s or contractor’s ability to minimize change orders; (6) the vendor’s or
contractor’s ability to prepare appropriate project plans; (7) the vendor’s or
contractor’s technical capabilities; (8) the individual qualifications of the contractor’s
key personnel; or (9) the vendor’s or contractor’s ability to assess and minimize
risks.”).
64. MINN. STAT. § 161.3420(2) (2001).
65. Id.
66. MINN. STAT. § 161.3420 (2001). For example, the Technical Review
committee would take the number of points assigned to a qualitative factor, assign
the bid a percentage of the points based on the bid’s ability to meet that criterion,
and then divide the points scored by the total points possible.
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DOT was the first governmental body permitted to consider the
qualitative merits of each proposal, the guidelines it operated under
shaped best value contracting in Minnesota.67 In 2005, the State
legislature expanded best value alternative to the Department of
Administration, the University of Minnesota, and the Minnesota
State Colleges and Universities systems.68 Today, any municipality
may use best value alternative.69
Clearly, best value alternative differs substantially from the
traditional lowest responsible bidder system because it allows the
non-pecuniary merits of each bid to modify the bid price and create
an “adjusted” low cost provider ranking.70 The result is that a bidder
who would not have received a contract under the lowest
responsible bidder system may be able to receive a contract under
best value alternative. This is especially true as awarding officials
have much discretion: they are free to establish any number of bid
criteria—so long as price is among them—and there is no clear
guidance on how much price, or any other criterion, must contribute
to the final “adjusted” score vis-à-vis other criteria.71
Today, every Minnesota municipality must use either the
lowest responsible bidder or best value alternative system for
contracts valued in excess of $175,000.72 While the exact contours
of what these systems entail is still unclear,73 the Minneapolis set67. MINN. STAT. § 161.3412(1) (2014).
68. MINN. STAT. §§ 16C.32–35 (2006); Act of May 25, 2005, ch. 78, 2005 Minn.
Sess. Law. 417.
69. Since first enacted in 2007, MINN. STAT. § 471.345(3)(a) has provided
municipalities with a choice between “best value” and “lowest responsible bidder”
methodologies.
70. See Rochester City Lines, 868 N.W.2d at 657 (defining “best value” alternative
as “a method by which a government contractor is selected by weighing various
quantitative and qualitative factors.”); Sayer v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.W.2d
151, 156 (Minn. 2010) (recognizing that the “best-value process differs from the
lowest responsible bid process in that it allows public agencies to consider factors
other than cost when awarding contracts.”); Dean B. Thomson, Mark Becker &
Jeffrey Wieland, A Critique of Best Value Contracting in Minnesota, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 25, 26 (2007) (noting how the Minnesota legislature “radically
changed” the contract award process by permitting the best value alternative
process).
71. MINN. STAT. § 16C.02(4) (permitting municipalities to consider other factors
including, but not limited to, “environmental considerations, quality, and vendor
performance”); Rochester City Lines, 868 N.W.2d at 667 (Gildea, Chief J., dissenting)
(noting how the court took no objection to a best value RFP that weighed 40% to
technical factors, 20% to past performance, 10% to financial ability, and 30% to key
staff interviews).
72. MINN. STAT. § 471.345(3)(a).
73. See Jocelyn Knoll & Lauren Roso, Do Minnesota Municipalities Have the
Authority to Source Public Works Contracts Using the Construction Manager at Risk
Delivery Method?, JDSUPRA (June 21, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/do-
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aside program operates in the same manner regardless of which
system is employed.74 Accordingly, a contractor’s ability to meet the
participation goals—or receive a waiver—is a prerequisite to
bidding.
D. Judicial Constraints on Set-Aside Programs
One year prior to Bolander, the Supreme Court of the United
States issued the foundational decision regarding set-aside
programs: City of Richmond v. J.A. Corson Construction. There, the
City of Richmond had adopted a municipal ordinance requiring
thirty percent of city spending to flow to Minority-owned Business
Enterprises (“MBEs”).75 The city could grant good faith effort
waivers, but only when the contractor demonstrated that it made
“every feasible attempt” to comply and that MBEs were
“unavailable or unwilling to participate” in the project.76 The city
justified this rigid quota system on five pieces of evidence: (1) the
population of Richmond was fifty percent Black, (2) less than one
percent of prime construction contracts had been awarded to MBEs
from 1978–1983, (3) the local construction association was nearly
all White, (4) the city attorney believed the quota system was
constitutional, and (5) anecdotal allegations of general
discrimination at the local and national levels of the construction
industry.77 Proponents of the set-aside program provided no
evidence of specific instances of discrimination by the awarding
body or the local prime contractors. Croson, a local non-MBE

minnesota-municipalities-have-the-48718/ (arguing that a cost-plus contract is
impliedly permitted under MINN. STAT. § 471.345 and capable of being competitively
bid); Dean B. Thompson, New Minnesota Statutes Allow Design-Build, CM at Risk
and Purchase Order Contracting for Public Projects, THE CONSTRUCTION LAW
BRIEFING PAPER (FABYANSKE, WESTRA, HART & THOMPSON) (Sept. 2005),
http://fwhtlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/New_MN_Statutes_Allow_Design_B
uild.pdf (arguing that municipalities may award contracts to an applicant other than
the “lowest responsible bidder”). But see Bob Huber, If It Walks Like a Duck:
Construction Management at Risk Contracts, a Risky Move for Cities, MINNESOTA
CONCRETE & MASONRY CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, http://www.mcmca.com/newsand-events/industry-news/construction-management-at-risk-contracts-a-riskymove-for-cities (last visited Oct. 7, 2017) (arguing that certain cost-plus contracting
methods violate competitive bidding requirements and need express authorization
by statute).
74. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCE tit. 16, ch. 423.90(g)
(2018) (providing a single standard requiring the contractor to make “every
necessary and reasonable effort” to subcontract work to diversity businesses).
75. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
76. Id. at 478.
77. Id. at 480.
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contractor who was denied a waiver, brought action challenging the
constitutionality of the set-aside program.78
The trial court upheld the set-aside program and the court of
appeals reversed on the grounds that there was no evidence that
the city was engaged in discriminatory practices itself. Specifically,
the court of appeals reversed because it found the set-aside program
was based on “broad-brush assumptions of historical
discrimination” and the thirty percent quota was “chosen
arbitrarily,” without relation to the number of local MBEs.79
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision, but
indicated that governing bodies may adopt race-based set-aside
programs even when the municipality is not actively engaged in
discriminatory practices.80 As to the City of Richmond, the Court
concluded that the city’s justifications for the set-aside program did
not provide “a strong basis for its conclusion that remedial action
was necessary.”81 Specifically, the Court found the statements of
discrimination conclusory and the disparity between the general
minority population and MBE awardees of “little probative value”
because the skills required in the construction trade made
comparison to the general population unwarranted.82 Further, the
Court held that objectively observable underrepresentation of
Blacks in the local construction association could not, without more,
justify remedial action.83
Additionally, the Court stated that it would still have struck
down the system, even if the evidence demonstrated substantial
discrimination, because it was not narrowly tailored.84 First, the
Court found the definition of MBEs, which included several
minorities, to be over-inclusive when the city’s evidence only

78. Id. at 483.
79. Croson, 488 U.S. at 485 (quoting J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822
F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1987)); Croson, 488 U.S. at 486 (quoting J.A. Croson, 822
F.2d at 1360).
80. Croson, 499 U.S. at 492 (“[I]f the city could show that it had essentially
become a ‘passive participant’ in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements
of the local construction industry, we think it clear that the city could take
affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.”).
81. Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277
(1986) (plurality opinion)).
82. Croson at 501 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 308 n.13 (1977)).
83. Croson at 503 (suggesting that for statistical underrepresentation to support
remedial action, the city would need to link it to a disparity between the number of
local MBEs eligible for association membership and the actual membership).
84. Id. at 506.
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concerned Blacks.85 Second, the City had not investigated the use of
race-neutral remedial actions before instituting the quota.86
Finally, the Court found that the thirty percent figure was arbitrary
and held no relation to the effect of the discrimination alleged or the
number or capacity of MBEs.87
The Croson decision indicates that any set-aside program
based on “an amorphous claim that there has been past
discrimination in a particular industry” will likely be struck down.88
Croson also provides significant guidelines for any municipality
desiring to encourage WMBE participation in the contracting award
process. Most importantly, Croson indicates that cities must have
substantial evidence of discrimination in order to have a compelling
interest in establishing a set-aside program.89 Second, that strict
quota systems will not be considered narrowly tailored because they
lack flexibility, a relationship to the present labor market and
particularities of a given project. Lastly, the Court indicated that
WMBE targets must be based on industry specific data and take
into consideration the capacity of the local WMBEs.
II. Analysis and Proposed Reform
As the existing SUBP program is set to expire December 31,
2025,90 it is an appropriate time to engage in critical discussion of
the Minneapolis set-aside program. Part A of this Section will
consider the program’s effectiveness, Part B will suggest that SUBP
can be more effective if it is revised to reflect the particularities of
best value alternative contracting, and Part C will discuss the equal
protection difficulties that may accompany the proposed reform.
A. SUBP Has Been Ineffective at Meeting Its Goals
Like its State-level peer, SUBP aims to “remedy the effects of
past discrimination against members of targeted groups.”91 To
reach this end, the City of Minneapolis has developed a system
wherein construction businesses owned by women, minorities, or
other disadvantaged groups can register for WMBE status and
85. Id.
86. Id. at 507.
87. Id. at 507–08.
88. Croson at 499.
89. Likely, this showing must elucidate a statistical disparity between the
disadvantaged group working within the challenged industry and that WMBEs are
qualified and available to work.
90. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCE tit. 16, ch. 423.160 (2019).
91. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCE tit. 16, ch. 423.10 (2019); MINN.
STAT. § 16C.16(4) (2019).
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participate, on a preferred basis, in city construction projects.92
However, an examination of recent trends shows that the existing
program’s performance is less than effective.
For example, the City of Minneapolis has required private
contractors engaged in public contracts to maintain construction
labor targets for women- and minority-owned businesses at six and
ten percent respectively since 2012.93 However, during the third
quarter of fiscal year 2014, women- and minority-owned businesses
secured less than four percent and eighteen percent of total onsite
labor participation, respectively.94 As labor expenses are significant
in construction, this disparity indicates that funding for WMBEs is
below the city-wide goals. Indeed, during the fourth quarter of 2016
only half of all Minneapolis projects met their SUBP participation
goals.95
At the state level, less than one percent of Minnesota’s two
billion dollars in contract awards for fiscal year 2014 went to prime
contractor WMBEs.96 And, of the twenty-nine vendors currently
suspended or disbarred by the Minnesota Department of
Administration, none suffer the label for failure to comply with setaside program requirements.97 Further, the 2017 Joint Disparity
Study, which analyzed the evidence of discrimination in city
contracting, found that “SUBP has not eliminated disparities for
minority- and women-owned firms in [c]ity procurement.”98 These
92. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCE tit. 16, ch. 423 (2019).
93. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, PURCHASING DEP’T, BIDS FOR 34TH AVENUE SOUTH
STREET RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT, Sept. 7, 2018, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us
/www/groups/public/@finance/documents/webcontent/wcmsp-213866.pdf.
94. MINNEAPOLIS DEP’T OF CIVIL RIGHTS., CONT COMPLIANCE DIVISION, 3rd Q.
Rep. 7, (2014) http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/www/groups/public/@civilrights/doc
uments/webcontent/wcms1p-135001.pdf.
95. Emma Nelson, Diversity in Hiring Falls Short of Goals for Public
Construction Projects, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/diver
sity-in-hiring-falls-short-of-goals-for-public-construction-projects/417348223/.
96. Assoc. Press, Minnesota’s Minority-Owned Companies Get a Fraction of State
Business, PIONEER PRESS (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.twincities.com/2016/08/10/mi
nnesotas-minority-owned-companies-get-fraction-of-state-business/ (attributing the
disparity to a lack of governmental compliance monitoring).
97. MINN. STAT. § 16C.285(3)(5) (2018) (requiring that a “responsible contractor”
have not more than one final determination assessing a monetary sanction for failure
to meet targeted group goals due to a lack of good faith effort from the Department
of Administration or Transportation for three years prior to the bid); MINN, DEP’T OF
ADMIN., OFFICE OF STATE PROCUREMENT, SUSPENDED/DEBARRED VENDOR REP. (last
visited Nov. 11, 2017), http://www.mmd.admin.state.mn.us/debarredreport.asp.
98. KEEN INDEP. RES., 2017 MINN. JOINT DISPARITY STUDY: CITY OF
MINNEAPOLIS (2018) at 4–5, https://mn.gov/admin/assets/Keen%20Independent%20
Minneapolis%20Disparity%20Study%20draft%20full%20report%2001292018_tcm3
6-325262.pdf, (“[T]here are fewer, minority- and women-owned firms in certain
industries than there would be if there were a level playing field for people of color
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numbers show that SUBP has been unable to redress the effects of
past discrimination in the local construction industry and suggests
reform prior to its reauthorization in 2025.99 In taking this step, the
legislature should tailor application of the SUBP goals to whichever
awarding system the city implements for each contract.
B. Proposed Reform: Integrating SUBP with Best Value
Alternative
The expansion of best value alternative contracting in
Minnesota during the twenty-first century is a significant change
for cities and contractors alike. While the broader contract award
law underwent this change, SUBP has failed to address the options
municipalities now have when choosing how to award contracts.100
Today, SUBP is applied in best value alternative settings in the
exact same way it is applied for lowest responsible bidder.101 This
dissonance is unsurprising given that SUBP is promulgated by the
City of Minneapolis while the Minnesota Municipal Contracting
Law was created at the state level. The vast distinctions between
the two contracting systems indicate that a wise set-aside program
should apply differently in order to avail itself of the potential
benefits offered by best value alternative.102
The principal benefit of developing a set-aside program that
responds to best value alternative is that the WMBE targets for a
project could be included in the proposal as a qualitative factor.103
As a qualitative factor, the awarding body could assign a Technical
Point Score to meeting the WMBE targets established for the
project by the CCD. A contractor meeting the target would then
receive all the available points and a contractor meeting only half
of the requirements would receive half the available points. As such,
a contractor’s ability to meet participation goals would do more than
and women in the Twin Cities marketplace. Business outcomes also differed for
MBE/WBEs compared with majority-owned companies. . . Utilization of minorityand women-owned firms in City procurement (11.17%) was below the 17.60% that
might be expected from the availability analysis.”).
99. Id. at 8–11 (suggesting new incentive programs, reforming existing
programs, working to reduce barriers to entry, and greater compliance monitoring).
100. The Small and Underutilized Business Program was last revised March 10,
2011.
101. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCE tit. 16, ch. 423.40 (2019).
102. A. Peter Hilger, BEST VALUE PROCUREMENT: LESSONS LEARNED (Regents of
the University of Minnesota, 2009), https://ccaps.umn.edu/documents/DCP/BAS-inCMGT-BVP-Paper.pdf (“The majority opinion from those interviewed . . . thought
[best value alternative] is an excellent way to . . . check for/include [WMBEs] . . . .”).
103. MINN. STAT. § 16C.28(1)(b) (2018) (establishing a non-exhaustive list of
factors for the awarding body to consider including “price and other criteria”).
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simply assure it of a seat at the table, it would directly impact the
competitiveness of its bid.
In addition to measuring the contractor’s plan to meet WMBE
targets on the instant project, the awarding body could also
incorporate, as another qualitative factor, the contractor’s success—
or failure—at meeting WMBE targets in past projects. Instead of
relying solely on CCD’s approval for the instant project, the
awarding body could utilize the discretion afforded to them under
best value alternative and wield a more precise tool.104 Including
WMBE targets as qualitative factors would grant the awarding
body an ex post and ex ante perspective supplying a finer
differentiation between bids.
Additionally, integrating SUBP with best value alternative
would address the scenario where contractors are permitted to bid
even though they failed to meet the WMBE targets yet exercised
“good faith efforts.”105 While the “good faith effort” provision of
SUBP provides equitable recognition of the difficulties a contractor
faces in hiring WMBEs in a local construction labor market that is
more than 95% White and 86% male,106 the current
underperformance of SUBP, when read in conjunction with the
skepticism surrounding the “good faith effort” provision, indicates,
at a minimum, that some may be gaming the system. Indeed,
according to one WMBE owner, contractors “know they have to
reach out to [minority] businesses with solicitations, but that’s all
they do because the state doesn’t follow up after that . . . That whole
good faith effort thing is a joke.”107 If this is the case, incorporating
participation goals as qualitative factors would help reduce abuse

104. The awarding body is not completely devoid of information concerning a
bidder’s past compliance under the existing system: it would be aware of whether
the bidder had violated SUBP requirements. However, this information is only
assistive for separating bidders that have violated SUBP requirements from those
who have not. As a qualitative factor, the awarding body would also be able to
distinguish between a pool of complying bidders based on the degree of success in
their past SUBP performance.
105. See MINNEAPOLIS DEP’T OF CIVIL RIGHTS, CONTRACT COMPLIANCE DIVISION,
3RD Q. REP. (2015), http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@civilrights/
documents/webcontent/wcms1p-152605.pdf; MINNEAPOLIS DEP’T OF CIVIL RIGHTS.,
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE DIVISION, SMALL AND UNDERUTILIZED BUS. ENTERPRISE
PROGRAM: SPECIAL PROVISIONS–CITY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS (2015), http://minne
apolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@civilrights/documents/webcontent/wcms1p144465.docx (providing the process requirements for auditing the good faith efforts
of a contractor that is unable to meet the WMBE targets, or whose efforts cannot be
verified) (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
106. Nelson, supra note 95.
107. Assoc. Press, supra note 96; see also Nelson, supra note 95 (concluding that
“[c]ontractors don’t have to meet the goals to win bids—there’s wiggle room.”).
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by presenting “good faith effort” in a measurable format fit for
comparison against other contractors. Indeed, if WMBE targets are
presented as a qualitative factor, SUBP could eliminate the “good
faith waiver.” In doing so, SUBP compliance would no longer
present the possibility of having an entire pool of bidders who have
waived out. The resultant ability to numerically compare the ability
of every bidder on every qualifying contract to meet WMBE targets
should increase the validity of the program in the eyes of
contractors, WMBEs, and the general public.108
For example, under the current system, a contractor who
misses WMBE targets by a substantial margin will be treated the
same as a contractor who only slightly misses the targets if they
both receive a “good faith effort” waiver. This system encourages
contractors to make just enough effort to be considered in “good
faith,” but does not provide any incentive to do more than that. If
WMBE targets operate as a qualitative factor, municipalities would
be able to incentivize contractors in direct proportion to the
intensiveness of their plan for meeting participation goals. Indeed,
a contractor unable to meet targets would receive a lower “adjusted”
score on its bid than if it had met the targets. As it is unlikely that
all contractors would fail to reach targets by the exact same amount,
the contractor that secured more work for disadvantaged groups
than its competitors would be more likely to receive the contract
award.109 If, however, contractors are not “gaming the system” and
the labor market is actually responsible for the target shortfall, the
difficulties of hiring WMBE will be shared across the industry and
contractors will enter the bidding process on an equal footing with
each other.
In changing the current treatment of participation goals from
a “pass/fail” binary into the more graduated assessment inherent in
108. Removing the good faith waiver may be imperative for this reform to be
successful as the main benefits of using participation goals as qualitative factors—
increased measurability of effectiveness and greater alignment of economic
incentives to meet goals—would be substantially undermined if a contractor could
opt out of the qualitative factor by securing a waiver. Failure to remove the waiver
may also provide a basis for award invalidation under the proposed reform. See
Rochester City Lines, 868 N.W.2d at 661 (finding that if an awarding body did permit
a contractor to opt-out of a qualitative factor, the final award would likely be
overturned for “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious” action).
109. Consider: if a contract has 1,000 qualitative points, and contractor A bid
$1,000 and scored 70% of the qualitative points because it was unable to fully meet
WMBE targets, its bid would have a technical score of 0.7. If, for the same award,
contractor B bid $1,200 and scored 90% of the qualitative points because it did a
better job at hiring WMBEs, its bid would have a technical score of 0.75. Contractor
B would receive the contract—notwithstanding a higher contract price—because of
its superior efforts in incorporating WMBEs.
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a qualitative factor analysis, the city would promote further
competition between contractors. Instead of proposing just enough
WMBE participation to bid, or merely engaging in enough “good
faith effort” to receive a waiver, bidders will have an incentive to
secure more WMBEs because doing so will provide a selection
advantage over their competitors.110
C. SUBP Reform: Equal Protection Challenge
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall. . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”111 In Adarand Constructors, the Supreme Court left no doubt
that a set-aside program classifying benefits based on race would be
subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.112
Therefore, SUBP, as it exists currently and under the reform
proposed by this Note, will survive a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge only if it forwards a compelling state interest and is
narrowly tailored to accomplish that interest.113
SUBP likely forwards a compelling state interest. As its stated
goal, SUBP aims to “remedy the effects of past discrimination
against members of targeted groups.”114 However, a benign purpose
is not sufficient; the city must have “a strong basis in evidence for
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”115 The
Minneapolis SUBP program likely meets this threshold because it
rests on much more than the City of Richmond’s “amorphous claim”
of past discrimination.116 Under the direction of the City of
Minneapolis, independent researchers have conducted periodic
Joint Disparity Studies to document, with great detail, the effects
of discrimination on the greater Minneapolis area.117 Indeed, the
Joint Disparity Studies appear to be a direct response to the Croson
decision, as the stated purpose of the studies directly mirror strict
scrutiny language.118
110. Or, conversely, to secure at least as many WMBEs as their competitors.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
112. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
113. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
114. MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(4) (2018).
115. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277; see Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (providing that a setaside plan must be “linked to identified discrimination.”); Id. at 490 (“The mere
recitation of a benign or compensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification
would essentially entitle the States to exercise the full power of Congress under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial classification from judicial
scrutiny under § 1.”).
116. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
117. See JOINT DISPARITY STUDY, supra note 29; NERA, supra note 16, at 1.
118. NERA, supra note 16, at 1 (“[T]he purpose of this Study is to assist the City
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NERA Economic Counseling evaluated SUBP in the 2010
Joint Disparity Study and found that over 80% of construction
businesses serving the Minneapolis area were non-WMBEs.119 Even
though nearly 20% construction businesses serving Minneapolis
were WMBEs, they received less than 8% of the City’s contract
award spending.120 Non-WMBE construction businesses received
over 92% of contract award spending.121 Certainly, this is the type
of industry specific evidence the Court found wanting in Croson.
Ultimately, the Disparity Study found that the statistical
disparities were (a) greater than could be expected in a race- and
gender-neutral marketplace and (b) stifled WMBE participation
such that there was “a strong inference of the presence of
discrimination.”122
With the first prong likely satisfied, the reformed SUBP must
demonstrate that it is narrowly tailored to its end. The chief
contention with the proposed reform will be whether removing good
faith efforts waivers conforms with narrow tailoring. In considering
whether a set-aside program is narrowly tailored, the courts will
look to several features of the program, specifically: (1) the
availability of race-neutral alternatives, (2) “the flexibility and
duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver
provisions,” (3) the relationship between participation goals and
labor market realities, and (4) the impact the set-aside program has
on third parties.123 In Croson, the court found Richmond’s set-aside
program unconstitutional on all points above because (1) there was
no evidence that the city considered any race neutral alternatives,
(2) the city rarely granted good faith waivers,124 (3) the thirty
in evaluating whether its current Small Underutilized Business Program to assist
small, minority-owned, and women-owned business enterprises is still necessary to
remedy discrimination, and to narrowly tailor existing and any new measures that
may be adopted.”) (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 12; id. at 3–4 (“[M]inorities and women are substantially and
significantly less likely to own their own businesses as the result of marketplace
discrimination than would be expected based upon their observable characteristics,
including age, education, geographic location, and industry.”); id. at 4–5 (finding that
Black Americans were paid 33% less than non-minority males when controlled for
other characteristics).
123. Geyer Signal v. Minnesota Dep’t of Transportation, Civil No. 11–321
(JRT/LIB), 2014 WL 1309092, at *15 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2014) (quoting United States
v. Paradise 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)).
124. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 478 (providing that Richmond’s set-aside program
only allowed waivers for “exceptional circumstances” where “every feasible attempt
has been made to comply [with the targets]” and “[the WMBEs] are unavailable or
unwilling to participate”).
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percent threshold shared no basis to the number of minorities
working in the construction industry, and (4) the program worked
a great hardship on third parties.125 In light of the reform proposed
by this Note, which suggests eliminating waivers, the “flexibility”
prong will be the most difficult to meet because the absence of
waivers cuts against the flexibility of the program. It may be
argued, for instance, that if WMBE targets exceed the number of
able and willing WMBEs available at a given time, the reformed
SUBP would not be able to give the kind of individualized
consideration offered by waivers and present “quota system”
concerns.126
Resultantly, the reformed SUBP would require constant and
precise monitoring of WMBE targets to ensure that the program
continues to maintain a relationship to the underlying disparities
and availability of WMBEs.127 This, however, presents little
additional burden to the CCD, as it is already required to set project
specific participation goals based on the availability of WMBEs and
scope of work.128 Indeed, if the CCD determined that a particular
best value alternative contract provided no opportunity for WMBEs,
then it would not solicit WMBE targets in the proposal.129
Furthermore, unlike the system in Croson, the proposed SUBP
reform would not render any contractor unable to bid because of
their inability to meet participation goals. While a contractor
underperforming on participation goals would be at a competitive
disadvantage to a peer fully performing on them, the reform
removes barriers to bidding. In a sense, the proposed system serves
the same purpose as a waiver because it will ensure that no
contractor is prohibited from bidding due to a legitimate
impediment to achieving WMBE targets. Just as a challenging
labor market may justify the issuance of waivers, the proposed
reform would be fair because market difficulties would be
experienced similarly by all bidders.
Ultimately, SUBP already has flexibility at multiple levels. If
reformed, SUBP would fulfill the same purpose as good faith
125. Id. at 507–08.
126. See Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago, 298 F. Supp.2d 725,
740 (2003) (“[Because] waivers are rarely or never granted . . . [t]he City program is
a ‘rigid numerical quota’. . . [These] formulistic percentages cannot survive strict
scrutiny.”).
127. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (holding Richmond’s 30% quota to be “outright racial
balancing” and not narrowly tailored because it held no relation to the number of
minorities actually employed in the construction trade).
128. PURCHASING DEP’T, supra note 24.
129. DEP’T OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22.
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waivers, even without providing for them. Potentially, a court may
even find that the reformed system is more flexible than the current
system because it removes barriers to bidding. As such, if WMBE
targets are presented as qualitative factors for best value
contracting, then the lack of a good faith waiver is unlikely to render
the program unconstitutional. If, however, the CCD were concerned
with the constitutionality of a system without good faith waivers,
there is a more conservative reform option.
The alternative option would be to incorporate the statutory
factors that the CCD must consider when deciding to grant a good
faith waiver as qualitative factors themselves instead of the WMBE
targets. As such, the Technical Review Committee would award
points to contractors that: modified their construction schedules to
accommodate for WMBEs, broke up large subcontracting jobs into
smaller parts more suitable for WMBEs, assisted WMBEs in
achieving bonding or insurance requirements, or utilized
organizations and resources to help them find WMBEs. While this
solution would likely require bidders to submit more paperwork and
increase the difficulty of awarding a contract, the assignment of
qualitative points would be analytically distinct from the WMBE
targets themselves. This may be more “flexible” to a court of law.
Conclusion
Minnesota municipal contracting law and the Minneapolis
Small and Underutilized Business Program are closely intertwined.
In 2007, the State legislature expressly authorized best value
alternative contracting and municipalities gained a powerful new
tool with which to exert greater control over the way their cities
develop. However, SUBP did not join in this sweeping reform; it
continued in the same practices and procedures it has used since
1999. With the expiration of SUBP on the horizon, and the effects
of discrimination still uncured in the local construction industry,
the Minneapolis set-aside program is well situated for reform.130 By
recognizing that best value alternative presents the opportunity for
awarding bodies to consider qualitative factors, and applying
WMBE targets as qualitative factors, contractors would have a
greater incentive to take on WMBEs While this reform presents
Equal Protection uncertainty, it also removes WMBE targets as a
barrier to bidding and, in so doing, likely provides the flexibility
Croson demands.
130. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCE tit. 16, ch. 423.160 (2018) (SUBP
is set to expire Dec. 31, 2025).

